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SHARPENING THE CAT’S PAW:
RECONCEPTUALIZING CAT’S PAW LIABILITY
TO FIT THE NEEDS OF CONTINGENT WORKERS
AFTER ARMSTRONG V. ARCANUM GRP. INC.
Ransom Smith*

ABSTRACT
Contingent workers—those employed by staffing firms and
contracting firms but often subject to the supervision and control
of a firm’s client—are a particularly vulnerable class of
employees, less likely to be treated by their employers with the
same degree of protection against workplace discrimination as
workers in traditional employment arrangements. The Tenth
circuit case of Armstrong v. Arcanum Grp. Inc magnified yet
another disadvantage that contingent workers run up against
when attempting to challenge an alleged discriminatory decision.
Following Armstrong, contingent workers who premise their
retaliatory or discriminatory discharge claims on the acts of
biased employees who influence employment decisions cannot
succeed unless the biased employee and the injured worker share
a common employer.
This rule, justified by the Tenth Circuit as an extension of agency
law, confounds the ability of contingent workers to hold staffing
agencies liable when their decisions to suspend or terminate an
employee’s position are influenced by the biased actions of client
employees. In Title VII vernacular, these employees would not
have a viable cat’s paw claim. Such a predicament is exactly of the
kind that the plaintiff in Armstrong found herself in when federal
agency officials spurned by Armstrong’s allegations of fraudulent
financial reporting convinced her staffing agency employer to
remove her from her federal position. This note exposes the
effective Title VII coverage gap created by cases like Armstrong
and leans on EEOC guidance tailored to the needs and interests
of contingent workers in its proposal of a solution to bridge the
gap.
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INTRODUCTION
Cat’s paw liability is an actionable theory of liability first articulated in the
Seventh Circuit opinion of Shager v. Upjohn.1 The metaphor of cat’s paw as an
unwitting dupe traces back to Jean de La Fontaine’s fable in which a beguiling
monkey coaxes an unsuspecting cat to snatch chestnuts from a fire.2 The cat braves
the dangers of the flames and repeatedly singes his paw, while the monkey contents
himself with devouring the hard-earned chestnuts. The folly of the cat and enterprise
of the monkey became apt symbols for a theory that enables a plaintiff to recover
when an individual is impermissibly biased towards a plaintiff, and a decisionmaker
innocently relies on the opinions or reports of that individual in deciding to terminate
or otherwise impair a plaintiff’s employment.3 The cat’s paw theory then stands as
one of the several strategies of establishing employer liability under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the first comprehensive statutory scheme to prohibit
unlawful discrimination “with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment” on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin.4
This note seeks to address the issues that arise when an agency worker
attempts to rely on the cat’s paw liability theory to redress the effects of
discriminatory bias attributable to the agency’s client. While a firm’s client may not
have the power to fire the employee placed with it, it nonetheless can affect a
decision-making process. When compared to workers in traditional employment
arrangements, contingent workers, such as workers employed by temp agencies,
staffing agencies, and contracting agencies, are less likely to benefit from federal
policies that safeguard against unlawful workplace discrimination. Generally, neither
the agency that formally employs contingent workers, nor the agency’s client that
dictates the terms and conditions of their work, feels accountable for complying with
or taking measures to enforce federal anti-discrimination statutes.
Mindy Armstrong, the plaintiff in Armstrong v. Arcanum Grp. Inc,
personally experienced the trials that stem from this dual unaccountability.5 After
having been placed by her employer staffing firm with the Real Estate Leasing
Services Division of the Bureau of Land Management, Armstrong allegedly
discovered evidence of falsification of leasing data and informed a supervisor of her
suspicions.6 Once such suspicions circulated in the department, Armstrong’s
accusations spurred bitter responses both from Armstrong’s immediate supervisor
and key department officials.7 Those affronted by her accusations sent a series of

1. See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).
2. See JEAN DE LA FONTAINE, THE FABLES OF LA FONTAINE (Elizur Wright trans., 1882),
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/7241/7241-h/7241-h.htm#IX21 [https://perma.cc/2693-UMRZ].
3. See Mark Nehme, Cat’s Paw Liability: Nine Lives Lead to Identity Crisis, 43 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 63, 63 (2019).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (1964) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012)).
5. Armstrong v. Arcanum Grp. Inc., 897 F.3d 1283, 1284 (10th Cir. 2018).
6. Id. at 1285.
7. Id.
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emails that prompted Armstrong’s primary employer, the staffing firm, to remove
her from her division placement and subsequently fire her.8
Facing discrimination on the job site from both a staffing firm employee
and the client’s employees put Armstrong in the unenviable position of arguing why
the staffing firm which employed her should be held liable for the acts of the client’s
employees. Her attempt to demonstrate employer liability for the actions of nonemployees also clouded Armstrong’s more traditional cat’s paw claim contending
that the bias of a staffing firm’s employee was a determinant of her termination. The
fog created by these closely related but distinct claims unfairly increased the danger
of mistaking wheat for chaff.
Part I of this note will present the legal and historical backdrop for
Armstrong. It will survey the development of the cat’s paw theory of liability used
to hold employers legally responsible for allowing their agents making personnel
decisions to consider information contaminated with unlawful bias. In analyzing this
theory, this part will argue that cat’s paw liability is unique among theories
establishing employment discrimination due to its use of a more forgiving causation
standard. The United States Supreme Court has resorted to agency law to develop a
framework for supervisory workplace harassment law.9 By contrast, the court has
selected the tort principle of proximate cause to develop cat’s paw liability.10 In light
of this history of the court’s use of proximate cause to develop cat’s paw liability,
courts should be more open to endorsing an expansion of cat’s paw liability to cover
the discriminatory and influential actions of coworkers. Some courts have done so
by acknowledging that coworkers are just as able to make internal reports that can
cause an employee to experience harmful employment outcomes as the supervisors
to whom the theory traditionally applies.
Part I will conclude by briefly surveying cases that suggest a different
approach, set forth in EEOC guidelines, for imposing liability for workplace
discrimination on both staffing agencies and their clients.
Part II of this article intends to recreate the main problem that Armstrong
faced when pleading her claim and challenge the perspective taken by the Tenth
Circuit, which limited the liability of Armstrong’s employer through a limiting
concentration on agency principles and a misleading recitation of the facts.11 This
type of selective focus should be avoided as it appears to have influenced the
Armstrong court to overlook the evidence produced for an orthodox case of cat’s
paw liability, alleging that unlawful bias of a supervisor poisoned an employment
decision.12 Part II will conclude by evaluating the merits of several possible solutions
to the dilemma raised in Armstrong.
Finally, Part III of this note proposes an additional theory of liability that
could be pled to protect the interests of employees of staffing firms, such as

8. Id at 1286.
9. Nehme, supra note 3, at 69.
10. Nehme, supra note 3, at 74.
11. See Armstrong, 897 F.3d at 1285, 1291.
12. See Opening Brief at 7–14, Armstrong v. Arcanum Grp. Inc., 897 F.3d 1283 (10th Cir. 2018) (No.
17-1378) (detailing the factual circumstances of the case).
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Armstrong. Such a theory informed by EEOC guidelines13 would establish a staffing
firm’s status as joint employer to render such employers liable for the discriminatory
actions of its client and client employees that the firm knew or should have known
about and failed to take prompt action to correct.
Part III will conclude by putting a modified theory of cat’s paw liability that
is informed by these EEOC guidelines into action by reimagining Armstrong’s case
as though she had claimed the theory.
BACKGROUND
I.

Development and Singularity of the Theory
A.

Development of Cat’s Paw Liability

Long after the inception of cat’s paw liability in Shager, the U.S. Supreme
Court officially took notice of this theory and cast it into its current form in Staub v.
Proctor Hospital.14 In Staub, a heart technician’s supervisors made comments
denigrating his commitment to military service, allegedly made false accusations that
he had left his desk without notice at an impermissible time, and communicated
accusations to the vice president of human resources who credited such accusations
and fired Staub.15 The majority probed relevant agency and tort law to decide
whether a decisionmaker’s adverse action and the subordinate’s “malicious mental
state” could both be attributed to an unbiased employer.16 The Court’s research into
the Restatement of Agency did not lend support to the proposition that a
subordinate’s malicious mental state could conjoin with a decisionmaker’s adverse
employment action to result in imposing liability on an employer “for a tort that
requires both.”17
However, the Court had characterized prohibited discrimination under the
anti-discrimination law in question, the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), as a “federal tort” that Congress knowingly
“enacted against a background of tort law.”18 The Court recounted instances where
federal courts presiding over cases involving federal torts had diverged from
conventional agency law and accepted a theory that linked mental state of one agent
and harmful action of another to establish principal liability.19 Since discrimination
under USERRA constituted a federal tort in this analysis, the Court followed suit
with federal cases that had allowed both malicious mental state or animus of a “firing

13. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF EEO LAWS TO CONTINGENT WORKERS PLACED BY TEMPORARY
EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER STAFFING FIRMS (1997), 1997 WL 33159161 at *11 [hereinafter
EEOC CONTINGENT WORKER GUIDANCE].
14. See Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011).
15. Id. at 414–15.
16. Id. at 418.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 417.
19. See id. at 418.
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agent” and harmful action or decision to terminate by a decisionmaker to be
attributed to the employer for purposes of USERRA liability.20
While in Staub’s case the vice president of human resources who ultimately
fired Staub harbored no discriminatory animus against him and was otherwise
innocent, Staub’s supervisors had demonstrated anti-military bias and thus had the
culpable state of mind needed to establish liability for USERRA discrimination.21
Staub’s supervisors insinuated themselves into the decision-making process by
making false allegations about Staub’s noncompliance with hospital policy and
reporting those allegations to someone in the workplace who had the power to
terminate him.22 The Court drew on the tort concept of proximate cause to reason
that once Staub’s supervisors had done so, the influence they as biased individuals
had on the decision-making process was a proximate cause of the decision to fire or
“a direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”23
Under the logic of proximate cause, a decisionmaker’s use of his or her own
judgment when deciding to terminate “does not prevent the earlier [biased] agent’s
action from being the proximate cause of the harm.”24 When a non-firing subordinate
acts in a manner that can influence a firing decisionmaker, such as making false
reports about employee misconduct, the effect of such bias will be attributed to the
decisionmaker. The only way to break the chain of causation between the submission
of biased reports and an adverse employment action is to undertake an independent
investigation into the matter that “results in adverse action for reasons unrelated to
the [subordinate’s] original biased action.”25
B.

Cat’s Paw in Comparison to Other Employment Discrimination
Claims

While cat’s paw liability is reminiscent of traditional tort vicarious liability,
its standard of causation is an anomaly in employment discrimination law.26 Staub
was not novel in its dependence on tort concepts when developing law for “lean
[federal] statutes” that do not set forth certain elements needed to prove a certain
type of discrimination.27 Staub instead was the next entry in a line of U.S. Supreme
Court cases that had leaned heavily on tort law to develop element based proofs and
causation standards for Title VII discrimination claims.28 This line originated with
one of the earliest cases in which the Court interpreted Title VII, McDonnell Douglas

20. Id. at 418–19.
21. Id. at 419.
22. Id. at 418.
23. Id. at 419 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
24. Id. at 421.
25. Id. at 421.
26. See Martin J. Katz, Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in
Disparate Treatment, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 510, 535 (2006).
27. See William R. Corbett, What is Troubling About Tortification of Employment Discrimination
Law, 75 OHIO ST. L. J. 1027, 1032 (contending that there is no particular compelling rationale for
expounding Title VII through tort law).
28. See Katz, supra note 26, at 494 (observing that tort law has been the vehicle of choice for Title
VII causation standards).
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v. Green.29 The Court there identified a discrete set of elements that a plaintiff would
have to prove for her Title VII claim to establish a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination.30 While nothing in Title VII suggests that Congress endorsed or
prescribed the use of an elements-based framework, the Court’s decision to do so
was an early signal of its preference for using tort-like principles to develop Title VII
statutory law.31
Later cases like Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins enhanced reliance on tort law
by introducing two different causation standards.32 One, “the motivating factor test,”
allowed plaintiff to claim that an employment decision had been motivated by
consideration of a Title VII trait (race, sex, religion, national origin) in order to shift
the burden of production as to legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for action taken
to the defendant employer.33 By contrast, the second causation standard, the “same
decision” test, allowed the employer to prevent the plaintiff from recovering
monetary damages by showing that the employer would have made the same
decision to terminate plaintiff even if it had not considered something like sex or race
when making its decision.34 Stated differently, the second causation standard
prevented plaintiffs from recovering monetary damages if defendants could
successfully argue that their improper consideration of something like sex or race
was not the but-for cause of its adverse decision. This would be true if the employer
had a legitimate reason for termination like employee misconduct alongside its
illegitimate one.35 Showing lack of but-for causation allows the defendant to prevent
a plaintiff from recovering money damages but not declaratory or injunctive relief.36
While the Supreme Court has given different names to other causation tests
that have been coined post-Price Waterhouse,37 all tests are just new ways of
expressing the two causation standards at work in Price Waterhouse, one not related
to tort and the other firmly rooted in it. The first “motivating factor” standard has no
precise tort analogue and is essentially shorthand for saying that the consideration of
something like sex or race played a role in or contributed in some manner to the
adverse employment decision.38 Relating logical concepts to tort causation
standards, Professor Martin Katz terms this causation standard “minimal
causation.”39 The second is directly derived from the tort-negligence concept of ‘butfor causation,’ and Professor Katz has pegged it to the logical concept of a necessary
condition. In but-for causation, a factor such as consideration of something like sex
or race could only be the but-for cause of an adverse decision if the decision would
not have happened absent unlawful use of an impermissible criterion like sex or
29. See Corbett, supra note 27, at 1037.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989).
33. Katz, supra note 26, at 528.
34. Id. at 502 (referring to the “same decision” as the “same action” test).
35. Id. at 491, 496, 512.
36. See id. at 511 (proposing that all causation standards in employment discrimination jurisprudence
can be collapsed into two categories of logical concepts of necessary condition and minimal causation).
37. Id.
38. Corbett, supra note 27, at 1054.
39. Katz, supra note 26, at 498–99.
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race.40 For this standard, if discrimination is not the but-for cause of the adverse
decision then the employer is not liable under Title VII. Cat’s paw liability can be
established under a minimal causation standard as a biased employee’s report need
only contribute rather than be the sole cause of an adverse employment decision.
Attentive proponents of Title VII reform have expressed reservations that
Title VII is a good area for the application of negligence causation due to a difference
in underlying policy objectives and the less physical nature of employment
discrimination.41 Mainly the worries of those concerned cluster around two
fundamental distinctions between tort law and federal employment discrimination
law. First, negligence law usually implies a harm that is the result of physical events,
whereas employment law typically implies a harm that is produced by discriminatory
attitudes and mental states. 42 Critics of but-for causation argue that it is categorically
harder for a plaintiff to prove that the loss of her job would not have occurred had a
defendant been of a neutral and not discriminatory turn of mind, than for a personal
injury to prevail on causation by proving that she would not have been injured but
for a physical event. Secondly, negligence law primarily functions to make the
wronged plaintiff whole through monetary compensation. In contrast, federal
employment discrimination law is intended to punish an employer for participating
in discrimination and deterring it from doing so in the future.43 When holding an
employer liable for violating Title VII is dependent on a plaintiff proving but-for
causation, an employer is able to engage in discriminatory conduct as long as it is
not the only reason for its adverse employment decision. In such cases, the
congressional commitment to punish and deter any discriminatory conduct in the
workplace lies fallow.44
Staub was the first Supreme Court case to devise of a theory of liability that
does not require a but-for causation component, but instead relies on the concept of
proximate cause to establish employer liability. Critics of supplementing remedial
federal schemes with tort law fault Staub for its use of proximate cause without
explaining why it should be used now when its use has never been suggested by the
text of Title VII.45 However Staub’s use of proximate cause deviated from other
previously borrowed tort conceits like but-for causation and is arguably more
consistent with the Title VII policy objective of broad deterrence. In its departure
from the Price Waterhouse motivating factor test, Staub installed a new standard that
was minimal causation instead of but-for and established both liability of the
employer and full recovery for the plaintiff. After Staub, a plaintiff did not have to

40. See id. at 515.
41. See Corbett, supra note 27, at 1048 (disputing the assumption that Title VII is particularly suited
to tort application in part owing to its fundamental concern with deterring future harmful conduct).
42. Id. at 1051–52 (quoting Gross v. FBL Financial Services Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (Breyer J.
dissenting) (“It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show ‘but-for’ causation. In that context,
reasonably objective scientific or commonsense theories of physical causation make the concept of ‘butfor’ causation comparatively easy to understand and relatively easy to apply. But it is an entirely different
matter to determine a ‘but-for’ relation when we consider, not physical forces, but the mind-related
characterizations that constitute motive.”)).
43. Corbett, supra note 26, at 1048.
44. See Katz, supra note 26, at 517.
45. See Corbett, supra note 27, at 1066.
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prove that if the act of the biased informer did not occur, the adverse employment
decision would not have occurred. Instead, a plaintiff only needed to show that a
subordinate’s bias played a role in influencing a decisionmaker to harm a plaintiff
and was a proximate cause of that harm.46 While not cause for comment in Staub
itself, this new standard was more generous to plaintiffs grappling with the problem
of establishing causation than any standard to precede it.
C.

Pinning Employers Under the Cat’s Paw for a Coworker’s
Discrimination

Staub’s theory of cat’s paw liability only addressed when it applied to
situations where a biased supervisor influenced an unbiased decisionmaker and left
the question of employer liability for the effects of the actions of biased coworkers
up for debate.47 Since Staub, no circuit court has “expressly extended the ‘cat’s paw’
doctrine to coworkers” or expressly limited the doctrine to just supervisors.48 The
circuit courts are instead split in terms of being either supportive of or opposed to
extending the theory to cover the acts of coworkers.49
The Tenth Circuit is among those circuits that have entertained the
proposition of extending cat’s paw liability to coworkers. Like other circuits, the
Tenth Circuit has not foreclosed the possibility of using cat’s paw liability but
declined in Hysten to extend cat’s paw liability to certain coworkers who have neither
“supervisory authority or influence . . . including authority or influence relating to
employee discipline.”50 Plaintiff’s coworkers in Hysten had made remarks that the
plaintiff believed were racist.51 However, the court held that whatever discriminatory
motive such comments may have revealed, such a motive could not be attributed to
the employer because the plaintiff had produced no evidence that such comments
“directly affected the action of an unbiased decisionmaker.”52 The court then
declined to extend cat’s paw liability in situations where a coworker had only made
suspect comments and had no demonstrable ability to influence an employment
decision.53
While no circuit court has expressly given its blessing to extending cat’s
paw liability to the actions of biased coworkers, there are several recurring
justifications for doing so.54 First, Title VII does not have a statutory definition for

46. EEOC CONTINGENT WORKER GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at *11..
47. See generally John S. Collins, Another Hairball for Employers? “Cat’s Paw” Liability for
Discriminatory Acts of Coworkers After Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 908 (2012)
(surveying federal circuit court stances on claims relying on the detrimental influence of a coworker’s
bias over an adverse employment decision).
48. Id. at 924.
49. Id.
50. Hysten v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 415 F. App’x 897, 912 (10th Cir. 2011).
51. Id. at 911.
52. Id. at 912.
53. Id.
54. See Nehme, supra note 3, at 83 (promoting a practical outlook that takes into account that
employees at all levels have access to reporting systems and can precipitate cascading discriminatory
effects through their use).
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“supervisor,”55 and using the strict definition of “supervisor” articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court would severely diminish the intended utility of cat’s paw.56 Vance
defined supervisor as “an employee . . . empowered by the employer to take tangible
employment actions against the victim” entailing “significant change in employment
status such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”57
This definition clarified when strict liability would apply to an employer for the
actions of a supervisor who—by virtue of his or her status and empowerment through
an agency relationship—was uniquely positioned to foster a hostile work
environment.58 By contrast, the Court in Staub fashioned cat’s paw liability to
address situations in which those without express power to take tangible employment
actions influenced those with such express power.59 If cat’s paw liability only applied
to those supervisors that had express power to tangibly affect worker employment,
then the theory would be rendered near-obsolete as it would only apply to the agents
of employers who are already liable under Title VII.60
Those opining on the soundness of extending cat’s paw liability have also
emphasized that both supervisors and coworkers alike have access to the disciplinary
reporting systems that facilitate the transmission and receipt of biased reports.61 They
observe that allowing an artificial line to be drawn between supervisors and
coworkers would risk permitting employers to rely on the biased information of rankand-file employees with impunity.62 Enforcing such a distinction would also have
the far-reaching consequence of inhibiting anti-discrimination statutes’ ultimate
purpose of eliminating discrimination in the workplace.63 As such, the case for
extending liability is based on recognition of common access to disciplinary
reporting systems vulnerable to bias and consistency with the overarching purposes
of federal anti-discrimination laws.
D.

Using EEOC Guidance Standards to Hold an Employer Liable for
Discriminatory Acts Attributable to its Co-Employer

In addition to the possible extension of cat’s paw liability to coworkers,
cat’s paw liability can also be extended through the use of the joint-employer
relationship recognized by the Equal Opportunity Commission in EEOC guidelines
specific to contingent workers. These guidelines recognize the unusual working
conditions of contingent workers and needed protections for such workers.
Contingent workers face more disadvantageous work conditions than workers in
traditional job arrangements. They earn lower wages on average, have lower rates of
health and pension coverage, and are less likely to receive full protection under
55. Id. at 78.
56. See id. (citing the definition established in Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 436 (2013)).
57. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 436 (2013).
58. Vance, 570 U.S. at 424.
59. Nehme, supra note 3, at 79–80.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
61. Nehme, supra note 3, at 79.
62. See id.
63. See id. (observing that if coworkers fall outside of the scope of cat’s paw, employers and their
agents can exclusively rely on their reports without fear of concomitant liability).

532

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 50; No. 3

federal equal opportunity laws due to the tendencies of both staffing firms and their
clients to “assume that they are not responsible for any discrimination or harassment
that their workers confront” at their assigned work sites.64 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission sought to correct this misconception and clarify when Title
VII and EEO guidelines apply to both staffing firms and staffing firm clients who
qualify as Title VII employers.65 The guidance instructs that qualifying as a Title VII
employer is dependent on having the “right to control” over “when, where, and how
the worker performs the job.”66 The presence of a right to control, suggesting
employer status, can include such factors as ownership of “tools, materials, and
equipment” that a worker must access on the job, ability to designate a specific site
where work is to be performed, ability to set hours of work, ability to supervise on
the job performance and factor observations into performance evaluation, and ability
to discharge.67
The guidance also acknowledges, in sync with Supreme Court precedent,68
that “all incidents of the relationship must be assessed with no one factor being
decisive.”69 Drawing from its specialized understanding of how staffing agencies and
their clients usually determine terms of employment, the guidance advises that both
staffing agencies and their clients will typically qualify as employers under Title VII
and thus operate as joint employers under relevant statutes.70 The guidance then
concludes in relevant part that a staffing agency will be liable if “it knew or should
have known about the client’s discrimination but failed to take prompt corrective
measures within its control.”71 Such available corrective measures could include a
staffing agency notifying its client of alleged discrimination, affirmatively
reinforcing its commitment to protect its workers from unlawful discrimination, and
demanding prompt investigative measures be taken.72
Various federal district courts and courts of appeals cases have relied on the
EEOC’s guidance to support the principle that a joint employer (or co-employer)
should be liable for the discriminatory conduct of its co-employer if it knew or should
have known about its discriminatory conduct and failed to take remedial action
within its control.73 In Bolin v. General Motors, LLC, a Michigan district court
denied a motion to dismiss contending that the plaintiff had failed to adequately plead
that defendants were Title VII joint employers and could be held liable for failure to
64. EEOC CONTINGENT WORKER GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at *2.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *4.
67. Id.
68. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992) (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co.
of America, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).
69. Id.
70. EEOC CONTINGENT WORKER GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at *5.
71. Id. at *11.
72. Id. at *11.
73. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Milwaukee County, 772 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 2014) (seeing no reason to
depart from “course set by other circuits” treating the guidance as a laying out valid bases for employer
liability; see also Lima v. Addeco, 634 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Lima v.
Adecco &/or Platform Learning, Inc., 375 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2010) (supporting the proposition that a
co-employer is liable for the discriminatory conduct of its affiliate if it knew or should have known of the
[discriminatory] conduct and failed to take corrective measures within its control”).
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reasonably remedy co-employer discrimination.74 While the court agreed with the
defendant employer’s contention that a joint employer is generally not liable for
discriminatory conduct of a co-employer, it also gave credence to the authority
expressed in the guidance.75 This guidance had previously surfaced in other federal
cases and had come to stand for the principle that an employer should be held liable
for not just its actions but also its omissions that had facilitated discriminatory
conduct.76 The court observed that all the cases cited by the defendant supported
“finding liability for a co-employer if the entity had the power to act but did not.”77
Such a method of establishing employer liability has garnered support in federal
district courts in the Sixth,78 Tenth,79 and Eleventh80 Circuits, and been validated by
the Second,81 Fifth,82 and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals.83
Most relevant to this note, in Byorick v. CAS, Inc., the plaintiff, Therese
Byorick, alleged that her employer-subcontractor should be held liable for the
retaliation she experienced at the hands of a defense contractor, also alleged to be
her employer.84 Byorick believed that she had been punished by the defense
contractor for reporting her supervisor for sexual harassment because the defense
contractor terminated her shortly after her report. Byorick also believed that she had
been abandoned by the subcontractor she worked for when it failed to intervene on
her behalf after she had expressed fears of reprisal.85 Despite these beliefs, the
subcontractor disclaimed any responsibility over the defendant’s decision to
eliminate Byorick from the defense contract she had been assigned to.86
In disputing this denial, Byorick persuaded the court that EEOC guidance
established important basis for holding an employer liable for the discriminatory
conduct of its co-employer when it knew or should have known of such
discrimination.87 Additionally, the court refused to find that liability would be
triggered only when an employer had knowledge of discrimination that was taking
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place or had already occurred.88 The court reasoned that EEOC’s inclusion of
conduct that the employer should have reasonably had notice of served Title VII’s
vital premise “not to provide redress but to avoid harm.”89 Both the goal of the
guidance to foil discrimination before it produces harm and the implications of an
extension of cat’s paw liability to the discriminatory acts of coworkers serve Title
VII’s core purpose of harm avoidance.
II.

Armstrong v. The Arcanum Group: Disadvantages Faced by Staffing
Employees When Asserting a Cat’s Paw Theory Claim
A.

Factual Basis for Armstrong’s Claim

Mindy Armstrong was an employee of the Arcanum Group Inc. (TAG), an
agency which provided for the staffing needs of government agencies.90 In July 2014,
TAG placed Armstrong with the Bureau of Land Management Real Estate Leasing
Services Department (BLM), where she would work as a lease administrator.91 While
working for the department, Armstrong was tasked with auditing department reports
that documented space that had been leased for agency use.92 Armstrong compared
department reports with underlying lease documentation and found that the footage
recorded in the reports did not match up with those listed in the original lease
documents.93 Specifically, Armstrong noticed that the reported leases had been
inflated and believed that such inflation tactics were being used by the department to
create the misimpression that the department had taken measures to reduce agency
leasing cost and space use.94
Concerned about the potential of fraud and violating federal policies,
Armstrong told a supervising TAG employee, Barbara Burns-Fink, that she had
reason to believe that BLM was falsifying data.95 While there was some dispute
between parties as to how Burns-Fink handled Armstrong’s accusations, the reports
that had disconcerted Armstrong had been prepared by Burns-Fink, strongly
implying her involvement in alleged fraud.96 Eventually Armstrong’s accusations
reached one of the team leads in the department and were circulated among other
department officials. Several BLM employees vehemently denied the accusations.97
In an email to the officer managing the contract between TAG and BLM, the
department team lead spurned Armstrong for having “accused [Burns-Fink] of
[having committed] fraud in the reports [she had been] preparing for BLM for more
than three years.”98 Burns-Fink also accused Armstrong in an email she sent to the
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team lead in which she acknowledged that “Armstrong accused [her] of reporting
fraudulent data.”99
These accusations and counteraccusations culminated in the department
team lead requesting that Armstrong be removed from her placement with the
department.100 The team lead cited the primary reason for removing Armstrong as
the unfounded accusations she had made against Burns-Fink.101 Shortly thereafter,
the BLM contracting officer put in the request to a TAG officer to remove Armstrong
from her position with the department, which TAG did without knowledge of the
reasons for the removal request.102 Since TAG had no other vacancies for Armstrong,
her employment with TAG was terminated as well.103
B.

Procedural History

Following her termination, Armstrong sued TAG pursuant to antidiscrimination provisions of the False Claims Act (“FCA”) and anti-retaliation
provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”).104 At the district
level, neither claim survived TAG’s motion for summary judgment because the court
found that Armstrong had failed to produce evidence to show that the removing TAG
officer had knowledge of her allegations at the time of removal.105 In the absence of
actual knowledge, Armstrong was unable to demonstrate that her allegations were
the but-for cause of her termination.106 Armstrong also asserted that under a cat’s
paw theory, TAG should be held liable for relying on the reports of a biased
subordinate, Burns-Fink, without independently verifying the credibility of the
biased information being used to influence an employment decision.107 Yet, the
district court also rejected this as a source of TAG’s liability, as no evidence had
been produced to suggest that Burnes-Fink had informed TAG’s removing officer of
Armstrong’s allegations of fraud.108 Therefore, the court found that Armstrong could
not prevail on such a theory.109
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit responded to Armstrong’s assertion of
employer liability under a cat’s paw theory with similar critique.110 Armstrong had
argued that both the BLM team lead that had sent a request to the officer managing
TAG’s contracts and that officer had played the role of biased subordinates under a
cat’s paw liability theory. Armstrong contended TAG should be held liable for the
effect of that bias because its removing officer took the reasons asserted for
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Armstrong’s removal at face value and without independent verification.111
Furthermore, Armstrong also emphasized that a fellow employee of TAG, BurnsFink, had played an instrumental role in participating and precipitating the
department’s retaliation against Armstrong.112 However, the Tenth Circuit did not
recognize either BLM employee as the type of subordinate contemplated in Staub
because neither were agents nor employees of TAG.113 The court stressed that the
theory rested on agency principles and could not be used to hold employers to
account for the biased actions of those completely external to a conceivable agency
relationship.114 While the court considered it plausible that TAG could be held liable
for blindly depending upon the reports of its own employee, Burns-Fink, the court
remained unconvinced that Armstrong had satisfyingly explained “how Burns-Fink
influenced [the team lead’s] request insofar as it was motivated by Armstrong’s
falsification complaints.”115 Once again, Armstrong’s articulation of liability under
the theory failed to persuade.116
ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS:
C.

Dissecting Armstrong’s Case to Diagnose Defects of Theory

The main actors in Armstrong and the roles they played in Armstrong’s
dismissal provoke consideration of the different degrees of cat’s paw theory.
Armstrong could only establish TAG’s liability by alleging that a fellow TAG
employee (Burns-Fink) acted as Armstrong’s supervisor, possessed discriminatory
animus against, and acted on that discriminatory animus to influence and
proximately cause Armstrong’s termination. This line of argument represents the
cat’s paw in its most confined state and most resembles how the Supreme Court
formulated the theory in Staub.
Yet Burns-Fink directed her biased report, in the form of an email claiming
that Armstrong had directly accused her of falsifying data, to a BLM team lead
instead of a TAG supervisor. That team lead in turn relied on such biased reports but
did not herself have express power to terminate Armstrong and could only request
the officer managing the contract between the staffing agency and its client to
effectuate her removal. Consequently, Armstrong contended that Burns-Fink’s
report was not transmitted directly to a TAG supervisor but mediated through a nonemployee of BLM, which had the effect of concealing Burns-Fink’s original bias and
misleading the TAG removing officer to blithely accept the request as a product of
client prerogative rather than employee bias.117 Armstrong’s case theoretically had
all of the constituent parts to make out a case of cat’s paw in the mold of Staub—a
supervisor, evidence of discriminatory bias, use of a reporting system pursuant to
that bias, and the production of a report that a firing agent considers when making
an employment decision. However, Armstrong’s claim was formed in the context of
111.
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a staffing agency-client relationship, complicating the analysis necessary to hold her
employer liable under this theory.
The Tenth Circuit’s discussion, while limited, casts into sharp relief the
unique problems employees of staffing agencies confront when attempting to recover
under the theory. In work environments like Armstrong’s, both employees of the
agency and employees of the client share office space, exchange ideas, and work
towards common agendas, but a staffing agency’s liability for relying on biased
reports spawned in this work environment hinges on the source of such bias.
At best, the Armstrong court ruled out the possibility that either any
discriminatory bias of the BLM team lead or the BLM contracting officer could be
attributed to TAG. This would be true “even if [the team lead] and [contracting
officer] could be considered supervisors or coworkers of Armstrong” because,
according to the Tenth Circuit, cat’s paw liability is premised on agency principles
and “[the contracting officer] and [team lead] were BLM employees and not agents
of Arcanum.”118 Burns-Fink, however, was an employee of Arcanum, and had
inserted herself into the decision-making process that concluded with Armstrong’s
termination.119 Nonetheless, the court dismissed Armstrong’s contention that BurnsFink had influenced the BLM team-lead’s request to remove Armstrong and while
doing so was “motivated by Armstrong’s falsification complaints.”120 Instead the
court characterized Armstrong’s argument as underdeveloped and reducible to a
“one-sentence argument in her brief.”121
The court’s perception of Armstrong’s argument regarding the involvement
of Burns-Fink as cursory and negligible reveals the challenge faced by staffing
employees. Those employees have to carefully identity the source of discrimination
to maintain an actionable theory. Armstrong set out to link Burns-Fink, the BLM
team lead, and the BLM contracting officer with the discriminatory intent that
factored into her termination, but only the intent of Burns-Fink as a subordinate of
TAG could legally be imputed to it. In adhering to an element-based analysis of the
theory, the court emphasized the nonexistence of agency relationship between BLM
employees and TAG, concluding that the theory failed without the establishment of
an agency relationship.
Next, the court withdrew from engaging in the type of analysis it undertook
in its discussion of the cat’s paw as applied to non-employees and wrote off this
distinct assertion of cat’s paw liability as inadequately supported. By treating the
involvement of BLM employees as the primary source of the discrimination alleged
and Burns-Fink’s involvement as an afterthought, the court did not account for the
possibility that both Burns-Fink and BLM employees were equally capable of
supplying discriminatory intent.
The court did so in neglect of the evidence Armstrong marshalled to
establish Burns-Fink’s discriminatory intent. In the court’s retelling of the facts,
Burns-Fink was merely Armstrong’s confidant of choice rather than the author of the
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data reports to which Armstrong was objecting.122 The court also framed
Armstrong’s interactions with the BLM team lead as consisting of the team lead
denying Armstrong’s accusations that fraud was occurring.123 Instead, Armstrong
provided evidence that the team lead had castigated her in front of the entire division
team for accusing Burns-Fink of fraud.124 The court made no mention of the email
Burns-Fink directly sent to the BLM-team lead in which she claimed that
“Armstrong had accused [her] of reporting fraudulent data,” and described the team
lead’s companion email complaining of Armstrong to the BLM contracting officer
in the most generic terms: “[t]he email requested that Armstrong be removed for a
variety of reasons, including Armstrong’s falsification accusation.”125
The actual email did not mince words and cited Armstrong’s accusations
against Burns-Fink as the primary reason for why her removal was desired, stating
that “[Armstrong] accused [Burns-Fink] of committing fraud in the reports that Barb
had been preparing for BLM for more than three years.”126 The court additionally
failed to address Armstrong’s allegation that Burns-Fink had colluded with the BLM
team lead in assembling examples of Armstrong’s work product which Burns-Fink
claimed reflected poorly on her performance.127 By consistently and selectively
overlooking facts that Armstrong had provided to establish Burns-Fink’s
discriminatory intent, the court rendered Burns-Fink’s involvement a practical
nullity. The court’s determination that Armstrong had failed to demonstrate BurnsFink’s involvement had been motivated by Armstrong’s accusations became a selffulfilling prophesy.
Armstrong’s failure to prevail on a cat’s paw theory reflects the inability of
the theory to function as intended when a staffing agency employee relies on it to
attribute discriminatory bias to her employer. As Professor Katz observes, all
causation standards in employment discrimination cases can be boiled down to two
categories: but-for or necessity causation and motivating factor or minimal
causation.128 The cat’s paw theory is a variant of the motivating factor standard,
where a plaintiff must establish that a biased report of a decision-maker’s subordinate
was a factor that contributed to the decision-maker ultimately taking an adverse
employment decision against the plaintiff. In non-cat’s paw Title VII cases, if a
plaintiff establishes causation under a motivating factor standard, a defendant can
mitigate the effect of such an accomplishment by proving that the consideration of
an immutable trait was not the but-for cause of its employment decision.129 The
employer limits plaintiff to declaratory and injunctive relief if the plaintiff’s evidence
did not satisfy a but-for causation test.130
Critics of grafting tort onto employment discrimination law have derided
Staub’s appropriation of proximate cause as a minimal causation standard for cat’s
122.
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paw as another thoughtless infusion of controversial tort concepts into antidiscrimination law. However, it is the only theory that allows a plaintiff to attain both
monetary and equitable relief under a minimal causation standard.131 This is perhaps
on account of the Staub majority’s recognition that once a biased report has become
part of the cumulative information used in making an employment decision, absent
independent investigation, the employment decision has been incorrigibly infected
with discriminatory motive.132
Yet, according to the court in Armstrong, for the staffing agency employee,
the ability to assert the theory is dependent on the source of discrimination, as a
staffing agency cannot be held liable for the discriminatory reports of nonagents such
as client personnel and employees. This limitation leaves staffing employees
effectively without recourse when their employer considers the biased reports of
nonagents when making an adverse decision. Such a result is exactly of the type that
the Staub majority predicted and tailored the theory to safeguard against. The Staub
court reasoned that respondent’s desire that the theory only be applicable when a
decisionmaker is motivated by his or her own discriminatory bias:
. . . would have the improbable consequence that if employer
isolates a personnel official from an employees’ supervisors, vests
the decision to take adverse employment actions in that official,
and asks that official to review the employee’s personnel file
before taking adverse action, then the employer will be effectively
shielded from discriminatory acts and recommendations of
supervisors that were designed and intended to produce the
adverse action. That seems to us an implausible meaning of [Title
VII], and one that is not compelled by its words.133
A staffing agency that retains the ultimate power to take an adverse action
while utilizing the reports of nonagents when doing so is in the same position as a
personnel official specially designated to make decisions with the aid of an
employee’s personnel file, but ignorant of the discriminatory biases that may inform
the file’s contents. Whether or not a staffing agency decision maker is actually aware
of the discriminatory biases of client reporters should be irrelevant, as those
reporters’ status as nonagents renders an employer legally ignorant of their biases.
The staffing agency remains free then to engage in the practice of relying on
discriminatory reports while being “shielded from [liability arising out of] the
discriminatory acts and recommendations” attributable to their employee’s
coworkers and supervisors.134 This is precisely the practice that the Staub majority
intended to prevent with its proximate cause construction of the theory. 135
An employee’s less favorable chances of recovering under cat’s paw owing
to the particular employment arrangements they find themselves in frustrate public
policy underlying both the theory and Title VII. Diminished utility of the theory
frustrates the policy aim of compelling employers to engage in due diligence research
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before committing to harming an employee’s interests. More broadly, an infirm
theory dilutes Title VII’s aim of deterring the future commission of workplace
discrimination. Finally, the theory’s intention to prevent a scheme of liability
insulation is compromised when a staffing agency can rely on biased reports that
originate outside the agency relation but still from within its employee’s workplace.
III. Sharpening the Cat’s Paw: Discovering Alternatives to Fix Cat’s Paw
Defects
Courts in the Tenth Circuit should take specific measures to correct at least
some of these impairments. At a minimum, when confronted with cases similar to
Armstrong, courts should be more circumspect by analyzing each alleged instance of
discriminatory influence separately. To this end, courts should review the record
closely and take note of all of the individuals who have been identified as having
inappropriately influenced the decision-making process. This request for
thoroughness is warranted because each individual represents a plaintiff’s discrete
attempt to justify reliance on the theory. Only after a court has done this type of
sorting can it properly confirm or deny whether the elements necessary to assert the
theory: discriminatory intent, agency relationship, adverse decision, and absence of
independent investigation are present.136 If the Armstrong court had followed this
course, it is unlikely that it would have treated Armstrong’s cat’s paw claim as to
Burns-Fink with summary disregard.
Expressly extending cat’s paw liability to cover the acts of biased coworkers
would also better the lot of staffing employees. The Tenth Circuit in Hysten made it
clear that there are circumstances where it would not consider an extension of the
theory appropriate.137 However, like other circuits, the Tenth Circuit has not ruled
out extending cat’s paw to cover coworker acts. In fact, a precedent cat’s paw case,
EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, counseled in favor of
extension.138 While dicta, the BCI court theorized that cat’s paw claims should cover
biased subordinates who accomplish “discriminatory goals by misusing the authority
granted to [them] by [their] employer—for example the authority to monitor
performance, report disciplinary infractions, and recommend employment
actions.”139 Thus, the BCI court made the case for extending the theory to apply to
coworkers who are “aided by [an] agency relation” and misuse their reporting power
to forward their discriminatory purposes.140
Notably, the Armstrong court did not indicate that the status of Armstrong’s
antagonists as either coworkers or supervisors was material. The court instead made
no distinction between supervisors and coworkers that would restrict use of the
theory.141 Even so, expressly incorporating the BCI court’s position that coworkers
who misuse the reporting process are a source of employer liability under the theory
would only slightly improve a staffing employee’s prospects of recovering under the
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theory. This relative improvement does not alter the basic reality that such plaintiffs
are surrounded by potential reporters who have no agency relation whatsoever with
a plaintiff’s employer. Fatally, even if cat’s paw was extended to cover the biased
actions of coworkers, staffing agency employees would still not be able to recover
under this extension when non-agent coworkers and supervisors are the
discriminating parties.
Ultimately, the current cat’s paw theory presents plaintiffs with few options.
If the agency relation disappears, plaintiffs are hapless, employers are immunized,
and Title VII’s machinery of curbing workplace discrimination through individual
adverse judgments seizes. In short, the theory is useful insofar as it exists in the
context of a case that presents only ideal conditions. To improve the odds of holding
an employer liable for its reliance on discriminatory conduct, a plaintiff should must
look beyond the current cat’s paw theory.
Commenters have lamented the trend of blurring tort law with employment
discrimination law and have suggested that there are other bodies of law more suited
to the task of filling out federal anti-discrimination statutes.142 Curiously, these same
commenters have not nominated a seemingly natural candidate: labor law. Yet the
labor law construct of joint-employer relationship provides the crucial assistance that
plaintiffs need to sustain otherwise doomed attempts to establish employer liability.
Following EEOC guidance and past federal decisions,143 when one
employer determines the terms of employment with another employer, that employer
is a joint employer.144 According to the EEOC, staffing agencies and their clients
will typically be categorized as joint employers.145 A staffing agency should be liable
for the discriminatory acts undertaken by its client and co-employer if the agency
knew or should have known of such discrimination but failed to take prompt
corrective measures within its control.146
The 1997 guidance resembles Staub cat’s paw in both purpose and function.
Like cat’s paw, the guidance rejects the proposition that employers should be held
liable only when the actor making the adverse employment decision is motivated by
his own discriminatory bias.147 The guidance denies joint employers the freedom to
be blamelessly indifferent to discrimination attributable to its co-employer that it
knew or should have known about.148 Much like a cat’s paw decision-maker who can
only break the chain of causation by conducting an independent investigation that
neutralizes the effect of impermissible bias, the joint employer must take prompt
corrective action to disassociate itself from its affiliate’s discrimination and its legal
aftermath.149 An employer will only be absolved for the knowable misdeeds of its
partner if it actively opposed them.
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IV. Cat Got Your Tongue: Making Employers Responsible for Inaction in the
Face of Discriminatory Conduct of a Co-Employer
For the counsel of a plaintiff like Armstrong to make the most of EEOC
guidance and the kinship it has with the cat’s paw entails several steps. Imagining
what Armstrong’s case would have looked like had her counsel chose this strategy
provides useful context. Like the plaintiffs in Bolin who plead facts sufficient in their
amended complaint to “make it plausible that [defendant] was a joint employer,”
Armstrong would have to set forth facts in her complaint adequately pleading that
Arcanum and BLM were her joint employers.150 To do this, Armstrong would point
to facts that demonstrate Arcanum’s and BLM’s joint exercise and control over
determining her work and working conditions. Here, Armstrong would plead that
Arcanum made final personnel decisions involving Armstrong, continually
monitored and evaluated her performance through a senior employee, Burns-Fink,
who worked with her on site, paid Armstrong’s salary, and withheld her taxes.151
Armstrong would claim that BLM’s exercise of control over her is apparent in its
authority to set her work schedule, delegate to her specific assignments, “provide
day to day instructions,” and supervise her daily performance.152
Armstrong would then allege (as she did) that the contract governing her
position only permitted BLM to request Arcanum to remove her if its reason for
doing so was failure to meet “[g]overnment expectations or requirements for
personal, professional, or performance standards.”153 When Arcanum’s personnel
manager called to determine why BLM’s contracting officer was requesting
Arcanum to remove Armstrong, he received no explanation related to the acceptable
reasons for removal established under the relevant contract. Given that the contract
had clearly defined parameters regarding sufficient cause for removal, Arcanum’s
personnel manager should have known that BLM’s refusal to provide a reason
contemplated by the contract increased likelihood of impermissible motive.154
Armstrong would cite Arcanum’s failure to adequately inquire into the reasons for
her removal request as the omission upon which its liability for the discriminatory
conduct of its co-employer would be based.
In anticipation of surviving a motion for summary judgment on the issue of
joint-employer status, Armstrong’s discovery production requests could have
included: her personnel file, performance reviews conducted both by BLM
employees and Arcanum’s on-site employee as evidence of joint supervision, email
communications regarding Armstrong’s work assignments and work schedule,
Armstrong’s W-4 form and Arcanum’s state tax withholding certificates as evidence
of Arcanum’s status as tax withholder, Armstrong’s payroll records to establish
Arcanum as manager of Armstrong’s salary, and any other related documents
tending to indicate codetermination of conditions and terms of employment. In later
stages of her case, Armstrong could infuse her argument on coworker liability with
cat’s paw logic. Specifically, Armstrong could contend that an employer should
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know that if it relies on a client’s report without independent verification, it risks
tainting its own decision with covert discriminatory bias. Armstrong could also posit
that conducting an independent investigation is squarely among the prompt and
corrective actions an employer must take if it is to preserve its innocence in the face
of its co-employer’s discriminatory conduct. Overall by leaning on EEOC guidance,
invoking the cases that legitimize its authority, and taking pointers from the cat’s
paw theory, employees of staffing agencies could devise a complete theory of
liability analogous in effect to a traditional cat’s paw claim.
CONCLUSION
Contingent workers as a class are already taxed with lower wage rates,
lower rates of health and pension coverage, and fewer fringe benefits. There is no
reason that the blunting of federal tools fashioned for worker protection should be
counted among their hardships. Some grave consequences of leaving the status quo
undisturbed are vividly captured in an Arcanum manager’s jarring admission that he
would honor a client’s request for removal “even if the request were based on race
discrimination, sex discrimination, or some other illegal reason.”155 That the spirit
and letter of Title VII and many other related federal anti-discrimination statutes
would countenance such practices because they arise out of peculiar industry
circumstances is improbable. After Armstrong, contingent worker plaintiffs should
posit a theory that will grant them access to a valuable strategy for establishing
employer liability, and the Tenth Circuit should be cognizant of the ills that spring
from denying such access and join other circuits in their uplift of Title VII’s mission
“not to provide redress but to avoid harm.”156
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